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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the relationship between the mind and the body requires 
understanding both the influence of body on mind, as in sensory perception, 
and the influence of mind on body, as in action. Motions of the body, it 
seems, are actions only if springing in some way from something in the 
mind. It seems likely that describing the aspects of the mind from which 
actions spring, not to mention describing what this "springing" amounts to, 
will require saying something about trying to act. After all, in many cases try-
ing to act seems to be the first thing that a person does in translating her 
plans and her aims into action. In order to act, it seems, we ordinarily first 
have to try. To try to act, however, is not merely to prompt action; it's also to 
act. Some behavior, even if only a twitch, is required for an agent to be try-
ing. l Thus trying seems to have a foot both in the mental and the physical 
and so it seems, and has seemed to others,2 to be the crucial element in the 
mind-body connection exhibited in action. 
The mental state of intention, and its close allies volition and choice, is 
also a crucial element in the story of t1e mind's progress into the world in the 
form of action. Is trying, however, merely a conglomerate of other things, of, 
in particular, intention (or its allies) and behavior? Or is the mental compo-
nent of trying to act something distinct altogether? To put this question in its 
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ontological form, does the furniture of a universe that includes trying to act 
include more than just intention and behavior? This paper examines this 
question and argues that one tries to act only if one intends to act. This result 
strongly suggests that the basic and fundamental element on the mental side 
of action is intention and that trying to act is nothing more nor less than 
intending to act and taking some steps. The result does not indicate this 
uncontrovertibly, of course. It's possible that while trying to act always 
involves intending to act (as will be argued here) it also involves some other 
mental component (as well as some behavior). But, as we'll see, the argument 
for the claim that one tries only if one intends suggests that this possibility is, 
at best, remote. 
This is not a purely abstract issue of import only to an abstruse subfield 
in the philosophy of mind. Consider the 1997 case of Jones vs. State. In the 
middle of a June night in Fort Wayne, Indiana, Curtis Jones, a member of a 
gang, went to the home of a rival gang member where a party was taking 
place. Jones fired four bullets into a crowd of people inside the home. Three of 
the bullets struck Troy Williams, who bled to death. The remaining bullet 
struck Latrail Gamble, who was injured but not killed. Jones was charged with 
the murder of Williams and the attempted murder of Gamble. In Indiana, and 
in much of the rest of the United States, an intention to kill is not required 
for murder. A person who causes another's death is guilty of murder in that 
jurisdiction if he knew his action was likely to kill another person, even if he 
did not intend to do 50.3 The jury found that Jones did indeed know that it 
was likely that firing bullets into the crowd would kill someone and so con-
victed Jones of Williams's murder. However, in Indiana, attempted murder, 
by contrast, does require an intention to kill. The jury acquitted Jones of the 
attempted murder of Gamble. After all, they presumably reasoned, although 
Jones knew that it was likely that he would kill someone, he didn't intend to; 
he intended, instead, to fire his gun, to frighten those associated with the rival 
gang and maybe even to injure them, but killing, the jury thought, was not 
his intention, even if he thought it might happen. Or, to put it another way, 
the jury seems to have thought that Jones could have done all that he 
intended even if nobody died. But if Jones didn't intend to kill, then, under 
Indiana law, he didn't attempt to. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed 
this pair of verdicts.4 
As it is in Indiana, so it is in much of the United States: intention to 
complete a crime is required for the attempt of it, even when the crime in 
question can be completed without such intent. Without additional propo-
sitions concerning the relationship between attempts and completed crimes, 
there is no contradiction here: why shouldn't the mental states required for 
attempt be different from those required for the crime attempted? However, 
there's an appealing view of the relationship between attempts and completed 
acts under which there is a contradiction in Indiana law. Ordinarily, we think 
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that attempts are to completed acts as eggs are to chickens: they hatch into 
them. But so understood, completed acts are simply attempts plus more; to 
get a completed action one takes an attempt and adds, for instance, a partic-
ular consequence that mayor may not have come about. Under such a view, 
an attempt cannot require anything of the agent that the completed act does 
not also require. Under Indiana law, Jones succeeded in doing something-
namely, kill Williams-that he never attempted; after all, had Williams sur-
vived his injury, Jones would have been no more guilty of attempting to kill 
him than he was of attempting to killl Gamble. But if the view that completed 
acts are attempts-plus is correct, the'n Indiana law rests on a contradiction, 
for under such a view this is flatly impossible. 
In fact, in some jurisdictions lawmakers have been sufficiently impressed 
by reasoning such as this as to broaden laws proscribing attempted crimes so 
that, if intention to complete the crime is not required for the completed 
crime, nor is it required for the attempted. In Colorado, for instance, "A 
person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for commission of an offense, he engages in conduct con-
stituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense."5 So, had 
Jones done what he did in Colorado, instead ofIndiana, he would have been 
guilty of the attempted murder of Gamble: he knew he was likely to kill 
someone in firing the shot that hit Gamble and only that "kind of culpabil-
ity" is required for attempt in Colorado. Legislators in Colorado, then, seem 
to think that one can try without intending, but not those in Indiana. 
Because of a disagreement that can only be thought of as a disagreement in 
philosophies of action, then, we find vast differences in the treatment of 
defendants who do not differ at all either in their actions or in the mental 
states from which those actions spring. However, given the appealing view 
that criminal punishment is to be issued only to the deserving, and given the 
just as appealing view that there has been an injustice committed when 
equally deserving defendants are tr.eated differently, it follows that either 
defendants in Indiana or those in Colorado are treated unjustly. Which statu-
tory scheme is unjust, it appears, turns on the question of whether or not one 
can try to act only if one intends to. 
To clarify, it is important to note that it is possible that both statutory 
schemes are unjust or that both are just, all things considered. Say we accept 
(as I am for the purposes of this paper) the following claim: There are good 
normative reasons for proscribing the behavior of those who try to act crim-
inally. One can appeal to that claim in support of one's laws proscribing 
attempts only if one's statutory definition of attempt casts its net around all 
and only the acts of trying to act criminally. Since Colorado's definition of 
attempt catches much more in its net than Indiana's, both schemes cannot be 
justified on the grounds that through them the state serves the just goal of 
proscribing the behavior of those who try to act criminally. However, there 
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may be other good reasons for casting the net as Colorado does; in such a 
case, and on the assumption that Indiana law supplies a definition of attempt 
to act that aligns with trying to act, both laws would be just. Or, if neither 
scheme defines attempt in a way that aligns with trying, and there are not 
good reasons to proscribe what the two schemes do proscribe, then both 
schemes would be unjust. For our purposes here, however, it is helpful to 
abstract away from other reasons that one might adduce for proscribing what 
either state proscribes and make only the normative assumption that there 
are good reasons to proscribe trying to act criminally. Nothing prevents a 
state from defining attempt in any way it likes; but only a definition that 
aligns attempt with trying can, in justifying its law, take advantage of the 
appealing idea that we don't want people to try to act criminally. Our ques-
tion, then, is what trying is and whether or not it requires an intention to act. 
Before moving ahead, it's important to head off a pair of possible mis-
understandings. The first possible misunderstanding concerns what, pre-
cisely, I will be arguing for. I am not arguing, merely, that trying to act 
requires some kind of intention. I am not claiming, for instance, that one can-
not try to kill without, say, intending to pull a trigger (or swing a knife, or 
drop poison in a coffee cup, etc.). Rather, I am claiming that one cannot try 
to kill unless one intends to kill. Trying to act requires intending the completed 
act, not merely something distinct from, even if in the neighborhood of, the 
completed act. So, I will be arguing that even in cases in which, for instance, 
the completed crime requires an intention to do something, although not an 
intention to complete the crime, it's not possible to attempt the crime with-
out intent to complete it. What this implies is that a statutory scheme "in 
between" Colorado's and Indiana's which required some intention for attempt, 
but not necessarily an intention to complete the crime, would, I will argue, 
fail for the same reasons as Colorado's: it draws the net too widely relative to 
the aim of criminalizing trying to act criminally. In any event, so as to avoid 
excessively complicated expressions, when the term "intention" is used here 
without a specification of what it is an intention to do, it should be under-
stood to refer to an intention to complete the act in question. 
The second possible misunderstanding concerns the justifiability of 
holding someone responsible for an act that he did not intend to commit. 
One might reason like so: If the jury is right that Jones did not intend to kill 
anyone (although he knew he was likely to), then he did not kill intention-
ally. But if he did not kill intentionally, then he is not responsible for killing 
(although he is responsible for those things that he did do intentionally, such 
as injuring and frightening people). So, the mistake in both Indiana and 
Colorado law that gives rise to the puzzling legal state of affairs described is 
not a mistake in those states' laws proscribing attempts, but in their murder 
laws. Their murder laws proscribe unintentional killings, and that's unjust. 
Colorado, in order to maintain a coherent legal code, then doubles the mis-
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take by proscribing "attempts" that do not involve intention, and so don't 
promise, even if completed, to end in intentional, and thus responsible, 
action. This bit of reasoning is flawed, for it rests on a pair of claims, both 
of which are initially appealing, but at least one of which is likely to be false: 
(1) An agent can act intentionally only if she intends to so act,6 and (2) An 
agent is responsible for her action only if the act was intentional. (1) admits 
of counterexamples in which agents intend something distinct from, but 
"close" to, what they end up doing and so do the act intentionally. For 
instance, say that Jones had intended to kill someone, but had no idea who 
would be at the party. Did he intentionally kill Williams? It seems so, even 
though he did not intend to kill Williams, whom he may not have even 
known to exist, much less expected to be at the party that night. Further, 
arguably, although not intending to kill anyone, in knowing that he might, 
and being willing to live with or even welcome that result, Jones thereby 
killed intentionally. It's possible, that is, that together with his intention to 
injure and frighten, his foreknowledge was sufficient to make his act of killing 
intentional, despite never having been intended. 
How many counterexamples (2) admits of will depend on what one's 
view of (1) is. If, for instance, you deny that Jones killed Williams intention-
ally, in the actual case in which he had no intention at all to kill, you might 
take his act of killing as an example of one for which an agent is responsible 
despite its being unintentional. Be that as it may, however, everyone must 
accept that, for instance, people are responsible for results springing from 
negligence, despite the fact that negligence necessarily involves an absence of 
any mental representation, much less any foreknowledge, of the results that 
figure in the description of the agent's act. It would be an absurdity to sug-
gest that the man who kills a pedestrian after failing to refill his brake fluid 
necessarily killed the pedestrian intentionally; precisely what makes the case 
the peculiar tragedy it is for not just the pedestrian, but also the driver, is that 
the killing is unintentional, and yet one for which the driver very well may 
never, and ought never, forgive himself. 
In any event, in what follows, I will be assuming that both (1) and (2) are 
false and thus that both Indiana and Colorado have defensible murder laws, 
although only one of them has a defensible view about attempted crimes. 
Since, as I'll argue, trying to act requires intent to act, it is Indiana that has 
the correct view of attempt. 
Section 1 describes and criticizes an argument of Michael Bratman's that 
implies, if it's successful, that one can try to act without intending to act. The 
argument depends on the theory of intention developed by Bratman in his 
book Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, as well as in a number of impor-
tan t papers on the topic. 7 Bratman calls the theory "the planning theory of 
intention:' Section 1 begins by examining the planning theory of intention 
and offering small, but important, modifications to it. This is followed by an 
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argument for the claim that the planning theory, suitably modified, does not 
in fact imply, as Bratman claims it does, that it is possible for an agent to try 
without intending. Section 2 goes one step further by employing the plan-
ning theory as a premise in an argument intended to show that, in fact, one 
can try only if one intends. If this argument succeeds, then not only does the 
planning theory fail to imply what Bratman takes it to imply, it implies the 
exact opposite. The conclusion of the paper draws out some implications for 
the law of the view of trying and intention argued for in the preceding 
sections. 
I. 
The planning theory of intention starts with the following important insight: 
what makes the mental state of intention distinct from other practical men-
tal states-mental states, that is, that playa role in deliberation and in the 
motivation and guidance of action-are the norms of rationality that govern 
it. Desires, for instance, are also practical mental states. But an agent has not 
failed to live up to the standards of rationality when she, for instance, has 
both a desire and an aversion for one and the same thing. By contrast an 
agent who intends something and also intends to prevent it from occuring is 
guilty of irrationality. To put Bratman's insight another way, we might say 
that intentions are in an important way belief-like (although Bratman does 
not think they are to be equated with beliefs). Beliefs, too, are governed by 
norms of rationality that do not govern other mental states like, for instance, 
hopes. Someone might hope that something occurs and hope that it doesn't 
without being guilty of irrationality; it makes perfect sense to see a possible 
future state of affairs as both attractive and unattractive, depending on how 
you look at it. But one who believes that something will occur, and that it 
won't, is irrational; that's just not a set of mental states that it could make 
sense to have. What is distinctive about both intention and belief is that the 
having of such a mental state qualifies an agent to be assessed by certain 
norms of rationality appropriate to the mental state in question. 
Bratman calls his theory "the planning theory of intention" because the 
norms of rationality that govern those with intentions are grounded in the 
aims of planning agency. Planning serves certain roles in helping us to reach 
our ends. In particular, it serves a coordinating role, helping us both to mesh 
what we do with what others do so as to reach joint goals, and to mesh what 
we do now with what we do later, and did before, so as to reach individual 
goals that require time-slices of the agent to work together. Thus, stated in its 
most general form, the planning theory of intention is comprised of the fol-
lowing pair of claims: 
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(A) An agent who has an intention is subject to assessment by certain distinc-
tive norms of rationality. 
(B) The norms of rationality governing those with intentions meet the fol-
lowing condition: by following these norms the agent's intentions support 
the forms of inter- and intrapersonal coordination that are available to plan-
ning agents. 
Notice that as stated the planning theory of intention could be filled out in a 
variety of different ways, depending on the precise specification of the norms 
governing those with intentions. In fact, Bratman's argument for the claim 
that one can try without intending relies on his view of the particular norms 
of rationality governing intention--namely, what he has called norms of 
"strong consistency," "means-end coherence:' and "agglomerativity:' 
The strong consistency requirement is this: an agent cannot rationally 
intend to do A if he believes that he will not do A. This is not to be confused 
with the view that if you intend to do A, then rationality requires you to 
believe that you will. Bratman's condition is weaker than this, for under it you 
could intend to do A, fail to believe that you will, and also fail to believe that 
you won't, without falling into irrationality. Someone who held the view that 
an agent with an intention to A is not rational unless he also believes that he 
will A might still subscribe to the planning theory of intention, for he might 
accept both claims (A) and (B). However, he would not subscribe to the par-
ticular version of the planning theory espoused by Bratman according to 
which only the absence of belief in failure is required to support the forms of 
inter- and intrapersonal coordination available to planning agents. 
The strong consistency requirement has attracted more attention in the 
literature than the other twu requirements and is, therefore, fairly well under-
stood.s The requirement of means-end coherence has been much less care-
fully examined. It imposes at least two distinct limitations on intention. First, 
it requires that an agent cannot choose just anything as his means to the 
achievement of a particular end and maintain rationality; rather, the means 
must fit the end appropriately or must, at least, do so relative to the agent's 
beliefs. The requirement of means-end coherence, that is, places an agent 
under rational pressure to select an action as a means to his end only if he 
believes it to be a possible means to that end. Further, an agent's intentions are 
means-end coherent only if he intends all those acts that are believed by him 
to be necessary means to other acts he intends. This isn't to say that rational-
ity requires that, for every action an agent intends, he also intends a means to 
that action; our plans are often left open without being worthy of rational crit-
icism. However, if the agen t believes an act to be required if he is to do as he 
intends, then rationality requires him to intend that act. In fact, the require-
ment of means-end coherence might impose the stricter requirement that an 
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agent intend all those acts that rationality requires him to believe to be 
necessary means to his ends, whether or not he actually believes them to be. 
Imagine an agent who has ample evidence that curing his disease requires 
amputation, evidence sufficient to convince any rational agent, and who yet 
refuses to believe it; and imagine that this agent refuses to intend to ampu-
tate despite his intention to cure the disease. He might have not just irrational 
beliefs, but irrational intentions, intentions that fail to be means-end coher-
ent despite the fact that he intends all the acts that he actually believes to be 
necessary means to the other acts he intends. 
Bratman is not as explicit as one might like as to what pressure is imposed 
by the agglomerativity condition. He says, "Given the role of intentions in 
coordination, there is rational pressure for the agent to put his various inten-
tions together into a larger intention."9 Under one natural construal of this 
statement, Bratman is requiring more of rational agents than he ought. Say 
Bratman takes the agglomerativity condition to be as follows: 
Agglomerativity 1: An agent cannot rationally intend to A and intend to B 
unless he also intends both A and B. 
Under this construal, the agent must actually formulate an intention to do 
both A and B in order to rationally intend A and intend B; he must "put his 
various intentions together into a larger intention." The problem with this 
formulation is that it demands mental labor from agents that they often have 
no need to perform, given their aims. For instance, imagine that I intend to 
go to Los Angeles tomorrow and to London one year from tomorrow; I have 
both plans. Does rationality require that I have an intention to do both 
things? Before answering this question, it is worth pausing momentarily to 
consider how a conjunctive intention to do both A and B differs from a pair 
of intentions, one to do A and another to do B. To see the difference, notice 
that the content of every intention is a single action, even if the action it 
favors is composed of other actions. Someone who has a single intention to 
go to LA tomorrow and to go to London a year from tomorrow intends a sin-
gle act, the act of going-to-LA-tomorrow-and-to-London-a-year-from-
tomorrow. What makes this complex event a single action? Perhaps nothing 
more than the fact that it is the object of a single intention that plays a role in 
bringing about the behavior in question. Still, the intention favors a single 
complex act. Thus, under the formulation on offer, the agglomerativity con-
dition requires that we conceive of everything we intend to do as one com-
plex action consisting of many smaller actions and that we intend that grand 
act. Now return to the question of whether or not rationality requires me to 
have the conjunctive intention to go to LA tomorrow and to London in a 
year. Formulating such an intention requires some mental work from me; 
this alone doesn't make it irrational, for there may be goods achieved through 
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this work. But are there? No, for I don't believe and have no good reason to 
believe, that I will have any trouble at all doing both things; a year is more 
than enough time to get from LA to London. In short, the mental work of 
formulating the conjunctive intention is work for which I will not be paid by 
being brought closer to the achievement of any of my ends. How could 
rationality require me to do work of that sort? 
Still, Bratman is right that there is rational pressure on occasion to "put 
our intentions together into larger intentions." This is required of agents who 
believe that they cannot do all of the particular things they intend, for 
instance. After all, there's no tension between an intention to A and a belief 
that I can't both A and B. Nor is there tension between that belief and the 
intention to B. I intend, for instance, to spend the afternoon writing and 
believe that I can't do both that and go to the movies; no problem there, for 
I don't intend to go to the movies. Still, someone who intends to A and 
intends to B and believes he can't do both is guilty of some form of irra-
tionality. What follows is that the belief places pressure on the two intentions 
despite not placing it on either one individually. Thus there must be some 
principle of rationality that requires the agent to compare his beliefs not with 
each of his intentions individually, but with them as a set; it is this idea that 
motivates the thought that the rational agent "puts his intentions together." I 
suggest that this condition ought to be understood like so: 
Agglomerativity 2: It is irrational to intend A and intend B if the intention to 
do both A and B would itself be irrational according to some other principle 
of rational intention. 
This formulation of the agglomerativity condition does not require that the 
agent actually formulate an intention to both A and B if she intends each 
individually; it doesn't require that the agent put all of her perfectly compat-
ible intentions into larger conjunctive intentions. Hence, it avoids the difficul-
ties encountered by Agglomerativity 1, for it doesn't require mental work from 
agents who have no need to perform it. However, Agglomerativity 2 does 
require that agents avoid having sets of intentions that cannot be combined 
into conjunctive intentions while maintaining rationality on independent 
grounds, and so it places agents under pressure to combine their individual 
intentions, and thus make conflicts evident to themselves, when there is 
doubt as to the rationality of the conjunctive intentions in question. 
Bratman's position, then, is that what makes a practical mental state an 
intention is that by virtue of having it the agent is subject to assessment by 
the norms of strong consistency, means-end coherence and (I will assume) 
Agglomerativity 2. (From here forward when referring to "the agglomerativ-
ity condition" I am referring to Agglomerativity 2.) This view lies at the center 
of Bratman's argument for the claim that an agent can try to do something 
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without intending to do it. The argument starts with reflection on examples 
with the following structure: Consider a person who wants either to A or to 
B, but not to do both. In order to do this, he decides that he'll try to do each 
knowing that his chances of doing both are very low, but that his chances of 
doing one or the other are much higher if he tries to do each than if he 
invests his energies in one course of conduct at the expense of the other. 
There are many examples of this sort. Every year high-school seniors take 
steps toward attending Yale and take steps toward attending Harvard-they 
apply to both, pay exorbitant application fees to each, travel for interviews, 
exort relatives to contact old friends in the admissions offices, etc.-knowing 
full well that they cannot attend both, and that, even if they could, to do so 
would be a sure way to fail to realize the benefits of attending either. 
Bratman's example is simpler: imagine that there are two video games in 
which the player is to maneuver missiles toward a target. Further imagine 
that the two games are wired in such a way that if one hits the target of game 
1, then both games shut down. This is similarly true with game 2. Further, 
were one to get very close to hitting the two targets simultaneously, both 
games would shut down before either target was hit. An agent who knows all 
this sits down to play both games simultaneously on the reasoning that if she 
divides her energies between both games she is more likely to hit one target 
or the other. 
Given Bratman's rationality conditions on intention, these are examples 
in which an agent is trying to do each of two things, but does not intend to 
do either. To see this, start by asking if Bratman's game-player intends to hit 
target I? If the answer is "yes;' then by symmetry she must also intend to hit 
target 2. However, if she intends to hit target 1 and she intends to hit target 2, 
and yet she believes that she will not hit both targets, she must have irrational 
intentions, for (by agglomerativity) an intention to hit both targets would 
have to be rational for her to maintain rationality; but it is not, for (by strong 
consistency) she cannot believe that she will not hit both targets given this pair 
of intentions. However, it is simply manifest that she is trying to hit target 1 
and that she is trying to hit target 2. Hence one can try without intending. 
The argument is not easy to reject. Notice that neither of two natural 
ways to reject the argument-by rejecting the strong consistency require-
ment, or by rejecting the agglomerativity condition-is, in the end, attrac-
tive. To see why, recall that the whole point of the rationality conditions on 
intention is their connection to the forms of coordination that are available 
to a planning agent. An agent who intends to do things that she flatly believes 
she will fail to do frequently faces a variety of insurmountable obstacles to 
the maintenance of both inter- and intrapersonal coordination. In general, 
the problem is that we can count on people to do as they intend; but we can-
not count on people to do as they believe they will not do. For instance, 
imagine that I intend to pick up my daughter at daycare at 4:00 today, but 
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believe that I will not; perhaps I expect myself to be hopelessly absorbed in 
my own work come this afternoon. 10 When my wife calls to ask if she should 
plan to pick up our daughter, what should I tell her? On the one hand, she 
can count on me to do it (I intend to) and, on the other, she can count on me 
not to (I believe I won't). The outcome that we both want-our daughter gets 
picked up and only one of us makes the trip to the daycare center-would be 
made more likely if I were to live up to the standards of a rational agent; but 
given my belief and intention this outcome is no more likely than either of 
the suboptimal outcomes (we both go to the daycare center, or neither of us 
does). What follows is that my intention is less than fully rational, and it is so 
precisely because I believe I will not do as I intend. We can just as easily gen-
erate cases in which violation of the strong consistency requirement under-
mines intrapersonal coordination: imagine, for instance, that I am wondering 
what to do with myself at 5:00 today. Can I count on having already picked 
up my daughter? Yes and no, depending on whether I consult my present 
intentions or my present beliefs. 
Obeying the agglomerativity condition seems no less essential to the 
achievement of the forms of inter- and intrapersonal coordination that are 
the hallmark of planning agency, and for the same reasons. The fact that an 
agent intends to A gives us reason to count on her to do so; similarly when 
she intends to B. But if she believes that she won't do both, then that gives us 
reason to think that she will fail to do at least one or the other, and she might 
do neither. What, in such a case, can we count on her to do? There's no say-
ing, and so the forms of coordination that require that we can count on 
agents to act in certain ways will be undermined when agents violate the 
agglomerativity condition. This is similarly the case if the conjoined inten-
tion-the intention to A and B-violates the requirement of means-end 
coherence by, say, requiring a means that the agent specifically intends not to 
do. In such a case, the intention not to undertake the necessary means allows 
the agent and others to count on her not to do it, while the pair of intentions, 
the intention to A and the intention to B, allows the agent and others to 
count on her to do so. Again, without being able to count on the agent either 
to act or not to, coordination is undermined. 
Of course, we can think up examples in which an agent does better byvio-
lating, rather than obeying, the requir,ements of strong consistency, agglomer-
ativityor even means-end coherence. A case in point is Gregory Kavka's "toxin 
puzzle" in which an eccentric billionaire offers to give you a large sum of money 
today now to illtend to drink a sickness-inducing toxin tomorrow that you 
know you will have no reason to drink when the time comes. Assuming that 
you believe yourself, in general, to do only what you prospectively see yourself 
as having reason to do, you have good reason to believe that you won't drink the 
toxin; you'll already have the money, so drinking will promise sickness and no 
reward. Still, you do better-you get the money-if you nonetheless intend to. 
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Notice that the kinds of cases in which inter- or intrapersonal coordina-
tion are undermined when agents violate the strong consistency requirement 
appear much more common than cases in which violation of that require-
ment actually furthers such coordination. It is an empirical matter whether 
or not this appearance is accurate. But imagine that it were not. Imagine a 
world in which people are constantly being rewarded when they intend to do 
things they believe they will not do. Imagine a world, that is, in which the 
very forms of inter- and intrapersonal coordination that planning helps us to 
achieve are achieved by those agents who violate the requirement of strong 
consistency and, for whatever reasons, are not achieved by those who obey it. 
Imagine further that the violators of the strong consistency requirement are 
not merely lucky to achieve coordination any more than the man who 
intends to drink the toxin while believing he will not is merely lucky to get 
the money; rather, the violators of the strong consistency requirement man-
age to put themselves into just the mental states that they need to be in, that 
it makes sense to be in in this world, if coordination is to be achieved. Who 
are the rational ones in this world, those who follow the demand of strong 
consistency, or those who violate it? 
Which answer to this question one is drawn to is a function of one's con-
ception of instrumental rationality. According to one conception of the 
instrumental rationality of a person's collection of mental states-what I will 
call the "causal conception"-the rational person is the one whose mental 
states conform to the model that there is good reason to believe will in fact 
serve her ends, given the causal structure of the world in which she lives. 
Under this conception, the violators of the strong consistency requirement 
are the rational agents, for there is good reason to believe that in the world in 
which they live it is through such violation that inter- and intrapersonal 
coordination are to be achieved. According, however, to another conception 
of rationality-what I will call the "attitudinal conception"-the rational per-
son is the one whose mental states conform to a model dictated by the char-
acteristic function or purpose of those mental states. To justify a claim to the 
effect that a particular set of mental states is not attitudinally rational to have 
we point to the purpose that such mental states are to serve and the way in 
which a set of mental states of the sort in question tend to frustrate that pur-
pose. To clarify with an example: it appears, just by reflecting on the notion 
of coordination, that coordination requires people to be able to count on 
themselves and others to act in certain ways; further, it appears, just by 
reflecting on the notion of "counting-on:' that we cannot count on agents to 
act in certain ways if some of their authoritative mental states, such as their 
intentions, represent them as acting that way, and others, such as their beliefs, 
as not acting that way. On the attitudinal conception of rationality, that is, the 
mental states in question impose constraints on agents quite independently 
of any facts about what will and will not earn the agent goods in the partic-
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ular circumstances in which he finds himself; the constraints are imposed 
simply by virtue of the nature of the attitudes in question. Those attitudes, 
by their nature, serve a particular purpose (such as inter- and intrapersonal 
coordination), and this purpose dictates the conditions under which such 
attitudes are rational or irrational; it dictates, that is, the norms of rational-
ity governing agents who have the attitudes in question. Under the attitudi-
nal conception, it is the agents who obey the strong consistency requirement, 
in our hypothetical world, who are the rational ones, even though, as it hap-
pens in that world, they do not achieve any of the forms of coordination with 
themselves and others that intentions are to make possible. ll An agent who 
obeys the strong consistency requirement in this hypothetical world is like a 
person who takes steps to heal his ailing appendix, rather than have it removed, 
even when healing it is more painful and promises no special benefit. It's true 
that, given the way of the world, a healthy appendix will never serve its nat-
ural function. Still, from the point of view of that function, the thing to do is 
to heal the organ rather than remove it. Similarly, from the point of view of 
the function of intention, the thing to do is to obey the strong consistency 
requirement, even if, given the way of our hypothetical world, this is to fol-
Iowa less than optimal course. 
As a further illustration of the attitudinal conception of rationality, notice 
that that conception can be used to explain the peculiarity of Moore's para-
dox. The man who asserts "p, but I don't believe it" might be accurately 
reporting his own beliefs: he might believe both p and that he does not believe 
that p. Nobody denies, that is, that this is possible. Nor is there any logical con-
tradiction in the contents of the two reported beliefs: one, the belief that p, 
concerns an extra-mental fact; the other, the belief that he does not believe 
that p, concerns a fact about his mind. So what's peculiar about the man's 
statement? The answer might be that the following is a norm of attitudinal 
rationality governing belief: an agent's belief that p is rational only if she does 
not also believe that she does not believe that p. Whether or not this really is a 
norm of the attitudinal rationality of belief will depend on what beliefs are for 
and whether or not there is a link to be found between obeying this norm and 
the function or aim of belief. Perhaps, for instance, the point of belief is to 
help us to reach knowledge and thus to motivate us to search for justifications 
for the things that we do believe. But such a search for justification requires 
self-conscious awareness of what one's beliefs are, and it is precisely this which 
is undermined by the presence of beliefs that one lacks the beliefs one actually 
has. Be that as it may, the point worth emphasizing is only that the notion of 
attitudinal rationality might be precisely what guides our intuition in reaction 
to Moore's paradox, an intuition that something has gone wrong in the state-
ment, even if it is far from clear, at first glance, precisely what. 
Return to Bratman's argument, seemingly showing that one can try to 
act without intending to do so. The argument depends crucially on the claim 
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that the game player, and others like her, would have irrational intentions 
were she to intend to hit target 1 and intend to hit target 2, given that she 
believes that she will not hit both. But would her intentions be causally or 
attitudinally irrational? They would not be causally irrational: the game 
player has good reason to believe that the having of both intentions is a good 
way, in the circumstances, to reach her goal of hitting exactly one target. The 
same point goes for any similar example: by intending to go to Harvard and 
intending to go to Yale, the high-school senior increases his chances of going 
to one or the other. However, the game player and the high-school senior 
have attitudinally irrational intentions and for just the reasons that Bratman 
suggests, reasons that have been rehearsed above: the point of intentions is to 
provide for inter- and intrapersonal coordination, and the norms of strong 
consistency and agglomerativity are linked to such coordination through the 
notion of counting on someone to act, an essential element in coordination 
that is undermined when agents violate strong consistency and agglomera-
tivity. So once we see that there are two different sorts of rationality inform-
ing our intuitions about which hypothetical agents are rational and which 
not, the assertion that the agent in the example is rational is seen to be equiv-
ocal: she is causally rational and attitudinally irrational. So, although she is 
manifestly trying to hit target 1 and trying to hit target 2, it does not follow 
that one can try without intending; the game-player very well might have the 
two intentions in question. 
To see the point in sum, it might be helpful to state the heart of 
Bratman's argument in syllogistic form like so, where it is assumed that the 
game player is trying to hit target 1 and trying to hit target 2 and believes that 
she will not hit both: 
1. The game player is rational. 
2. If she intends to hit target 1 and intends to hit target 2, then she is irra-
tional. 
:. She does not intend to hit target 1 and intend to hit target 2. 
What I have suggested is that this is "a syllogism with two middle terms" and 
so its conclusion doesn't follow from its premises. The term "rational" in 
premise 1 refers to causal rationality, while the term "irrational" in premise 2 
refers to attitudinal rationality. 
Bratman can resist this argument by insisting that the game-player is 
attitudinally rational or, in other words, by insisting that "rational" in prem-
ise 1 refers to attitudinal rationality. However, it would be a mistake to sup-
port this assertion merely by appeal to intuition. Our intuitions about 
rationality are not terribly fine grained and are influenced by various irrele-
vant factors such as the way in which an example is described. Say, for instance, 
that one tells the story of two game players who happen to be named Hesperus 
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and Phospherus. Hesperus is trying to hit target 1, Phospherus target 2. Each 
knows that both targets can't be hit and each is extremely confident in both 
his own abilities and his superiority to the other. Further, they are working 
together, aiming to make it the case that between them one target is hit, by 
having each of them do their utmost to hit their respective targets. They 
assume, and let's assume they are right, that the chances of them hitting the 
two targets simultaneously are inordinately slim, and that the chances of one 
or the other hitting a target would reduce drastically were each to do any-
thing less than his utmost to hit his assigned target. I think it would seem to 
most people that each is rational and that each intends to hit his respective 
target. Why does anything change when it turns out that Hesperus and 
Phospherus are one and the same person? 
Further, and more importantly,. it is possible to support the claim that 
the game player in Bratman's example is attitudinally irrational with reasons, 
and not just with intuitions. Where we have the violation of a principle of 
rationality there is a call for explanation, a need to say how what is before us 
makes sense. Imagine that you are given only the following pieces of infor-
mation: the game player is trying to hit target 1 and trying to hit target 2; he 
wants to hit at least one target; he believes that he cannot hit both. Now if the 
player's behavior is to make sense, we need an answer to the following ques-
tion: "Why is he trying to hit each target, rather than just trying to hit one or 
the other?" The answer, of course, is that he thinks it more likely that he'll hit 
one if he tries to hit each than if he tries to hit only one. But the answer isn't 
the point; the point is that the question needs answering if we are to find the 
game player's conduct intelligible. Further, and importantly, we wouldn't 
need an answer to that question if the game player did not believe that he 
can't hit both targets. What this shows is that given that the agent in the 
example is trying to hit each target, he is under rational pressure not to 
believe that he can't hit both and, importantly, that pressure goes away only 
by imagining alterations in his mental states, such as absence of the relevant 
belief. The presence of this pressure needs explanation, and it is provided by 
the presence in the game player of the intentions to hit the targets, for where 
there is intention there are the pressures under which the game player labors. 
Notice that we can't explain the pressure to explain himself by appeal to 
different intentions from the intentions to hit each target. If, for instance, the 
game player merely intended to try to hit target 1 and intended to try to hit 
target 2, there would be no pressure to explain, for he believes that he can do 
both of those things, just as he believes that he can take all the steps short of 
succeeding in his efforts to hit both targets. The same would go for any other 
retreat in the content of the intentions associated with his tryings. So long as 
he's trying to hit each target while believing that he can't hit both, he owes us 
an explanation; that debt can't be expllained by appeal to any intentions other 
than the intentions to each target. (There remains the possibility, to be 
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headed off in the next section of this paper, that the need for explanation is 
to be explained by the tryings themselves, independently of any associated 
intentions. But for now, let that pass.) 
Bratman is right that we assent to the claim that the agent in the exam-
ple is rational, but he is wrong about why we assent. We assent not because 
the game-player is under no pressure to explain why trying to hit each target 
makes sense in the face of the belief that he can't hit both but because we see 
that, although he has crafted his set of mental states in a way that violates 
norms of attitudinal rationality, he has done so because doing so is the best 
way to reach his goals in the circumstances. In other words, our assent to the 
game-player's rationality derives from our allowing causal rationality to 
trump attitudinal, in this case, in our all-out assessment of the agent's ration-
ality. Whether it would do so across the board is unclear, but it doesn't mat-
ter for our purposes. What matters is that the pressure to explain himself 
under which the game-player labors indicates that, whatever we think of his 
rationality all told, he is not attitudinally rational. 
It's important to see that there is a deflationary move that could be made 
here, and would be attractive to someone skeptical of the very idea of attitu-
dinal rationality. We might say that the only kind of rationality is causal 
rationality. This is not to say that there isn't appeal to principles like strong 
consistency and agglomerativity. However, we might understand such prin-
ciples not as exceptionless norms of attitudinal rationality, as I, following 
Bratman, have suggested, but, instead, as rules of thumb specifying how, gen-
erally, one's mental states ought to be ordered if they are to help one to coor-
dinate one's behavior inter- and intra personally. Under this deflationary line 
of thought, what we learn from the game player example is merely that the 
norms of strong consistency and agglomerativity admit of exceptions: there 
are rare cases when it makes sense to violate them. Where I have painted the 
pressure to explain himself under which the game player labors as speaking 
to the violation, on his part, of the norms of attitudinal rationality governing 
intention, the advocate of this deflationary line of thought would suggest that 
this pressure arises merely from the fact that the game player is not obeying 
a rule that, in most circumstances, it makes sense to follow; he explains him-
self to us simply by showing that his circumstances are not of the usual sort, 
and so are not covered by the rules in question. 
The advocate of this deflationary line of thought might support his posi-
tion by directly attacking the very coherence of the notion of attitudinal 
rationality. In fact, the notion seems to have a very soft spot: what gives a par-
ticular mental state its "aim" or "function"? If the answer were to appeal to, 
say, the fact that, characteristically, mental states of the relevant sort cause 
certain attractive results-intentions, typically, cause coordination, for 
instance-then it might seem that there is no more to attitudinal rationality 
than causal; the conditions under which a mental state can be reasonably 
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expected to bring about a certain result are determinative of the norms of 
rationality that the mental state is to meet. But if the actual causal role of the 
mental state is not what determines its aim or function, then what does? 
What makes it the case that one mental state is to playa role in producing 
inter- and intrapersonal coordination and another is not? 
Someone who conceives of the principles of strong consistency and 
agglomerativity as mere rules of thumb and who supports the position with 
this sort of attack on the very notion of attitudinal rationality is in partial 
agreement with me, for such a person accepts that Bratman's argument fails 
to show that it is possible to try to act without intending to. However, such a 
person goes on to insist on something that I deny, namely that Bratman's 
game player is rational in every meaningful sense. Under this view, the game 
player seems irrational at first glance in the same way that someone who 
harms another seems to be doing something that falls short of maximizing 
utility. In this last case, we can dispel that impression by indicating how caus-
ing harm will result in more utility given the agent's very special circum-
stances; analogously, we can indicate how the game player is actually more 
likely, rather than less, to achieve intrapersonal coordination by violating the 
principle of agglomerativity given his very special circumstances. 
The notion of attitudinal rationality, as a kind of rationality distinct 
from causal, will, in the next section of this paper, serve as a premise in a pos-
itive argument for the claim that one tries to act only if one intends to. So, the 
deflationary position just sketched is not available to me, despite the fact that 
both its advocate and I deny that Bratman's argument shows that claim to be 
false. What I can hope to do here, however, is merely to acknowledge a debt 
that, unfortunately, I will not pay fully in this paper: a full defense of the 
argument to be offered below would require defense of the notion of attitu-
dinal rationality. However, one thing can be said here in defense of that 
notion: an analogy to biological functions at least gives one pause in acqui-
escing to the deflationary claim that principles like agglomerativity and 
strong consistency are nothing more than rules of thumb. Eyes have the func-
tion of helping us to detect the properties of objects that are at some distance 
from our bodies and not in immediate contact with them. A large part of the 
reason for believing this is that, in fact, our eyes cause us to detect remote 
properties. There is a meaningful sense in which one hasn't done what's 
healthy for one's self when one gouges one's eyes out, even if, for some 
strange reason, this results in an improvement in one's ability to detect the 
remote properties of objects. We might say that the function of one's eyes 
places one under pressure not to gouge them out, even when gouging them 
out will help one to realize the very goods that eyes have the function of pro-
viding. In similar fashion, the thought goes, the function of one's intentions 
places one under pressure not to violate strong consistency or agglomerativ-
ity, even when doing so will help one to realize the very goods that intentions 
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have the function of providing. In short, the notion of attitudinal rationality, 
as something distinct from causal, is no less appealing than a natural and 
appealing conception of health as linked to the biological function of one's 
organs. 
In summary, then, we can ask two different questions about the ration-
ality of an agent's mental states: (1) Do her mental states conform to patterns 
that fit with their aims or functions? (That is, is she attitudinally rational?) 
and (2) Do her mental states conform to patterns that there is good reason 
to believe will further her ends, under the circumstances? (That is, is she 
causally rational?) There is little reason to think that reflection on the second 
of these questions can tell us very much about intention or trying. After all, 
there is so much variation in the circumstances that agents face that there is 
little reason to expect there to be anything in common among the sets of 
mental states possessed by the causally rational or the causally irrational. By 
contrast, we can ask ourselves whether or not an agent's mental states make 
her assessible by the norms of attitudinal irrationality appropriate to inten-
tion and thus determine if she has an intention, rather than some other men-
tal state. Thus, we have a tool for assessing whether or not an agent has an 
intention that is far better than the usual appeal to linguistic or conceptual 
intuition. Instead of asking, of a particular agent, "Would we say that she 
intends to A?" we can ask "Would we take her to be irrational were she to fail 
to meet the demands of strong consistency, means-end coherence, and 
agglomerativity?" What we've learned from discussion of Bratman's views is 
that it is important that this question is confined to consideration of attitu-
dinal rationality, to the exclusion of causal; if we allow consideration of both 
we end up concluding that the game-player and others like her lack intention, 
a conclusion that is unwarranted for the reasons already given. 
II. 
Arguing against an argument against a claim is not the same, of course, as 
arguing for the claim. So far it's been argued only that the planning theory of 
intention ought not to be construed in such a way that it implies the falsity 
of the claim that an agent tries to act only if he intends to. This section goes 
farther by arguing that, in fact, when construed as described in section 1, the 
planning theory actually implies the truth of that claim. That is, when we take 
seriously the idea that to have an intention is to be subject to the norms of 
strong consistency, means-end coherence, and agglomerativity, understood 
as above and understood only as norms of attitudinal rationality, it follows 
that one tries only if one intends. 
At the end of the last section it was suggested that one of the virtues of 
the planning theory of intention is that it supplies a tool for systematically 
522 
determining if an agent or hypothetical agent has an intention that does not 
require appeal to the vagaries of linguistic or conceptual intuition. We need 
only determine if the agent is subject to the distinctive norms of attitudinal 
rationality that govern intention-namely, strong consistency, means-end 
coherence, and agglomerativity (construed as Agglomerativity 2). However, 
we now need to look more closely at this claim. In particular, we need crite-
ria for determining whether or not an agent really is to be assessed by the 
norms of attitudinal rationality governing intention. Such criteria, however, 
are not as difficult to produce as one might think. Notice that whenever a 
person seems to violate a norm of rationality, of whatever sort, he owes an 
explanation that shows how, at least by his own lights and perhaps by ours as 
well, his seemingly incongruous mental states or behavior actually make 
sense. When an agent seems to violat(~ a norm of attitudinal rationality he can 
meet this explanatory demand, and thus show that, in fact, he is not in vio-
lation of the norm, in one of two ways. He can show that either (a) he actu-
ally lacks the relevant attitude on the basis of which the norm applies to him, 
or (and more importantly for our purposes) (b) the violation of the norm of 
attitudinal rationality actually, in the circumstances, is a means to some end 
that he possesses and he is, therefore, causally rational. 
For instance, if a person announces that he intends to win the lottery we 
first want to know if he believes it to be fixed, or if he has peculiar beliefs 
about probability that don't imply, as ours do, that he won't. When we find 
out that, in fact, he, like us, believes that he will not, then we expect some fur-
ther explanation, for the agent appears to be in violation of the norm of 
strong consistency. He can, at this point, suggest that he doesn't really intend 
to win, but merely to buy a ticket and keep a positive attitude, say. This is to 
adopt the first approach in explanation of his apparent violation of the norm; 
it amounts to saying that the norm doesn't actually apply to him at all, that 
he is not to be assessed by it. Alternatively, the agent can give us an explana-
tion of how having the intention to win, in the face of the belief that he will 
not, is causally rational. He might say, for instance, that he's influenced by 
social-psychological research that shows that those who intend to win, 
whether or not maintaining attitudinal rationality, are much more likely to 
win. He might say that he really doesn't know why this is-he can't think of 
any explanation himself-but he badly wants to win and so sees the having 
of the intention to win, in the circumstances, as worth the pain of attitudinal 
irrationality. This is to explain his behavior by appeal to its causal rationality, 
its likelihood to serve his ends, given the circumstances, even in the face of its 
attitudinal rationality. 
The question, then, of whether or not an agent who is trying to A also 
intends to A has reduced to this: Does the agent owe an explanation if his 
mental states fail to conform to the norms of attitudinal rationality govern-
ing intention? Would he owe an explanation if, say, he is trying to A while 
believing he will fail that either indicates that he is not, despite appearances, 
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trying to A at all, or that trying to A, in the circumstances, and in violation of 
the norm of strong consistency, is a good way to reach his ends? I believe he 
would. To see the argument for this claim, consider, first, why we might think 
that an agent who is trying to act while believing he will fail owes us an expla-
nation of the relevant sort. The argument will extend to the other two norms 
of attitudinal rationality governing intention. 
There are a wide variety of circumstances in which agents try to do 
things that they believe they will not do and whom we would not pronounce 
irrational. In a recent paper, Carl Ginet has identified three kinds of cases. 12 
First: An agent might believe she can't do something, but also believe that 
she's far from infallible in the assessment of her own abilities. She might then 
try to do the thing she thinks she can't in order to find out if she's right. She 
might do this because she has strong reason to succeed in acting, but she also 
might do it because she has reasons for wanting to know her own abilities 
even though she has no reason to succeed in acting. Second: An agent might 
believe she can't do something but be challenged by someone else who claims 
she can. To prove this other person wrong, she might try to do that thing. 
Such an agent might lack a reason to succeed in acting and might also lack a 
reason to know her own abilities; she might only, that is, be trying to act in 
order to prove another wrong. It is worth looking at the example that Ginet 
uses to illustrate the third sort of case. He writes, 
Suppose Sam knows that raj log is far too heavy for him to move 
by pushing on it. But Sam is a soldier under the command of 
Rudy, and Rudy has ordered Sam to try to move the log by push-
ing on it. Sam would very much prefer that Rudy not find out 
that he (Sam) cannot move the log by pushing on it, but the 
penalty for refusing to obey the command would, in Sam's view, 
be a worse consequence than Rudy's knowing that Sam cannot 
move the log by pushing on it. So Sam pushes on the log as hard 
as he can in order to comply with Rudy's command to try to 
move it by pushing on it, but very much regretting ... that by so 
doing he will reveal to Rudy that he cannot move it by pushing 
on it. 13 
By making it part of the example that Sam does not want Rudy to know that 
he can't move the log, Ginet distinguishes this case from the second sort of 
case in which the agent hopes to show another person that he can't do the 
thing he is trying to do; Sam's reason for trying, in Ginet's example, is his 
desire to comply with the command. Notice that Ginet has provided a blue-
print here for generating an arbitrarily large number of categories of agents 
who try to act while believing they can't. Abstractly, Ginet's example is con-
structed as follows: Assume that S believes that he cannot A and that he has 
no reason to successfully A. Assume also that agents sometimes have reasons 
of types Rl, R2 ... Rn for trying to A that are not also reasons for successfully 
A-ing (i.e., sometimes they want to see if they can A, despite their belief that 
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they can't; sometimes they want to prove to someone else that they can't; 
etc.). Now imagine that, for some reason, S is positively averse to trying to A 
for reasons of any of these n types (in Ginet's example, instead of wanting 
another to know that he can't A, he wants that other person not to know 
that). But he has a stronger reason for trying to A nonetheless (in Ginet's 
example, he wants to avoid whatever penalty would befall him were he to fail 
to obey the command). Using this blueprint, we can generate an arbitrary 
number of distinct types of example in which an agent has reason to try to A 
but, by the nature of the construction, lacks any of the previously identified 
possible reasons for doing so. The point can be put another way: Since any-
thing can cause anything else, trying to act can cause anything one likes. In 
order to generate an example of an agent who tries to A while believing he 
can't and maintains rationality, we merely set things up so that his trying to 
act will cause something that he wants more than he wants to avoid any of 
the other things that trying to act will cause. 
The point is that in all of Ginet's examples and in all of the possible 
examples that one might construct by following in Ginet's footsteps, we pro-
nounce in favor of the agent's ratiol11lity in trying to act in the face of belief 
in failure only because we see how, in light of his ends, it makes sense for him 
to do so. These are pronouncements of causal rationality, not of attitudinal. 
They amount to the giving of the second sort of explanation identified above 
for deviance from the norm of strong consistency; instead of denying that the 
agents in question are really trying to act, we show how, in light of their cir-
cumstances, trying to act in the face of belief in failure is a good way to reach 
their ends. What follows is that we are yet to find an example of an agent who 
tries to act while believing he can't and maintains attitudinal rationality. 
To say this much isn't to say that such agents are attitudinally irrational, 
but only that our reasons for thinking them rational derive from our recogni-
tion of their causal rationality. We need more in order to support the point 
I'm after-namely, that those who try to act while believing they will fail are 
attitudinally irrational. But to support this point we need an argument for 
thinking that there's a link between compliance with the norm of strong con-
sistency and the point or purpose of trying. We found such a link between that 
norm and the purpose of intending (namely, inter- and intrapersonal coordi-
nation) through the connection between coordination and the need to count 
on those with whom action is being coordinated. Is there a similar link in the 
case of trying? Yes. To see this, start by noting that the function of intention 
and the function of trying must be quite closely intertwined, for the function 
of trying to act is, in part, to support the function of intending to act. It is by 
trying that we translate our intentions into behavior. But it is behavior that 
must be coordinated if we are to reach our individual and joint ends; plans 
can mesh as much as we like, but until we act on them we don't get where we 
want to go. Plans by themselves don't give us coordination, although they are 
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essential to it; we also need to act on our plans, and it is by trying to act that 
we do so. Just as intending is a universal means to coordinating our behavior, 
trying to act is a universal means to acting, and thus to coordinating our 
behavior (among other things). If we can't count on ourselves or others to try 
to act, then we can't count on them to act; and if we can't count on them to 
act, we can't coordinate our behaviors with them in ways that are essential for 
reaching our ends. 14 
This isn't yet an argument; it just amounts to the observation that the 
roles of intending and trying are not so easily disambiguated. However, we 
are now in position to produce the needed argument: Trying to act serves all 
the ends that action serves. In fact, its function is to enable agents to achieve 
whatever ends are achieved through action. Now if trying to act is to serve 
this purpose then we must be able to count on ourselves to act when we try; 
that, after all, is why we try. But if the norms governing those who intend 
apply to them because we need to count on them to act, the very same norms 
apply to those who try. So, if you try, you are assessible by the very norms that 
apply to you when you intend. Since assessibility by such norms is what 
makes an agent's mental state one of intending, it follows that if you try to act 
you also intend to. 
The argument just offered can be put more carefully: 
1. If an agent has a mental state the content of which is to A, and the function 
of that mental state requires that the agent can be counted on to A, then she 
is on those grounds assessible by the norms of strong consistency, means-end 
coherence, and agglomerativity. l (p&q) ~ r] 
2. If an agent has a mental state the content of which is to A, and she is on 
those grounds assessible by the norms of strong consistency, means-end 
coherence, and agglomerativity, then she has an intention to A. l (p&r) ~ s] 
3. (from 1 & 2) If an agent has a mental state the content of which is to A, and 
the function of that mental state requires that the agent can be counted on to 
A, then she has an intention to A. [(p&q) ~ s 1 
4. If an agent is trying to A, then she has a mental state the content of which 
is to A, and the function of that mental state is to make it the case that she /\s. 
[t ~ (p&u)] 
5. If the function of a mental state is to make it the case that an agent /\s, then 
the function of that mental state requires that the agent can be counted on to 
A.lu~q] 
6. (from 4 & 5) If an agent is trying to A, then she has a mental state the con-
tent of which is to A, and the function of that mental state requires that the 
agent can be counted on to A. [t ~ (p&q)] 
:. (from 6 & 3) If an agent is trying to A, then she has an intention to A. l t ~ s] 
The stretch of argument of premises 1-3 employs the driving ideas behind 
the planning theory of intention. The stretch of argument from premise 4 to 
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the conclusion extends those ideas to determine what mental states the try-
ing agent must have. 
It is worth making a few comments about this argument, by way of clar-
ification. First, notice that the argument does not imply, nor do I believe it's 
the case, that one cannot act without trying to act. Just as one can achieve 
coordination without intention, one can act without trying to. Nonetheless, 
the point of trying is to act, just as the point of intending is coordination. 
Second, as Ginet's examples, and the other examples that we can gener-
ate following his lead, show, it is perfectly possible for an agent to serve some 
other end, besides acting, by trying, an end that is achieved just by trying, 
independently of action. This, however, is no objection to the argument just 
offered for in this respect trying is just like intending: as the toxin puzzle 
shows, intending can serve some other purpose besides inter- and intraper-
sonal coordination. Just as this fact is compatible with the fact that the point 
of intending is to achieve coordination, the fact that Ginet's examples illus-
trate is compatible with trying's function being to bring about action. 
Third, to say that we must "count on" people to act as they intend or as 
they are trying to act, is not to say that action is, or need be, guaranteed if try-
ing and intending are to serve their respective purposes. We might count on 
ourselves to act as we try in just the way that we count on ourselves and oth-
ers to do as we intend; it's always possible that people won't do what we are 
counting on them to do, but there is nonetheless a presumption of action 
where there is trying or intending. There's another way to put the point: 
Unless it's hopeless, it always makes sense to advise those who hope to coor-
dinate their behavior to make plans. This is true even though we all recognize 
that sometimes the best laid plans don't get us coordination, and even though 
we all recognize that sometimes people achieve coordination fortuitously and 
without planning. Similarly, unless it's hopeless, it always makes sense to 
advise someone who hopes to act to try. This is true even though we all rec-
ognize that sometimes we fail despite our best efforts and sometimes we suc-
ceed effortlessly. The reason that these are both good pieces of advice, despite 
the fact that they don't identify certain routes to success, is that what is being 
advised is to use the tool that you can count on to work; planning is the tool 
for coordinating, and trying is the tool for acting; we can count on those tools 
to work, even though they don't always. 
This point should go some way to answering concerns that might be 
raised about premise 5, the claim that the function of trying to act requires 
counting on the trying agent to act. It might be objected that the sense in 
which the aim of coordination requires that we can count on agents to do as 
they intend is quite different from the sense in which the aim of acting 
requires that we can count on agents to do as they are trying to do. Our 
chances of coordination are low when we can't count on agents to do as they 
intend. But there is no comparable problem when it comes to acting; it's not 
as though an agent's chances of acting are lower if the agent can't be counted on 
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to do as he tries. Counting-on serves a clear instrumental role in generating 
coordination, but no comparable instrumental role in generating action. 
While this is correct, it doesn't serve to undermine the argument, for there is 
another sense in which counting on agents to do as they act is necessary for 
accomplishing the characteristic aim of trying: it's what provides reason to 
try. Counting-on is necessary to make trying worthwhile (when trying isn't 
serving some purpose distinct from its characteristic purpose); similarly, 
counting-on is necessary to make intending worthwhile (when intending 
isn't serving some purpose distinct from its characteristic purpose). So, while 
counting-on is necessary to the purpose of intending for different reasons 
from those for which it is necessary to the purpose of trying, it is nonetheless 
necessary for both, and that's all that the argument requires. 
In any event, we have now reached the result at which this paper aimed: 
In trying to act, and thereby employing a mental tool the function of which 
can be realized only if we can count on the agent to act, the agent becomes 
subject to the very norms of attitudinal rationality that govern those with 
intentions. Since, as the planning theory of intention has shown us, to have 
an intention is to have a practical mental state that makes one appropriately 
assessible by such norms, it follows that if one tries to act, one intends to 
act. 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, this result does not show, uncon-
trovertibly, that there is no more to the mental side of trying to act than 
intending. But notice how suggestive the argument offered here is of that 
result. If what individuates types of practical mental state are the norms of 
attitudinal rationality to which those with those mental states are subject, and 
if it is the case, as has been argued, that those who try are subject to the 
norms governing those who intend, then it is hard to see what grounds one 
could have for distinguishing the mental component of trying from inten-
tion. This isn't to say that there are no possible grounds: it's possible that 
there will turn out to be additional norms of attitudinal rationality govern-
ing those who try that do not govern those who intend. But in the absence of 
a description of such norms or even an argument for thinking there are any, 
it seems likely that the mental side of trying is just intention. 
CONCLUSION 
Return, finally, to the law. As I said at the beginning, the result reached here 
has an immediate practical implication. It provides an answer to the follow-
ing question: Which of two statutes proscribing attempted crimes is defensi-
ble, one (like Indiana's) that makes intent an element of attempt even when 
the completed crime does not require intent, or one (like Colorado's) that 
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requires for attempt only the mental states required for the completed crime? 
The answer is the first, for without intent nothing that a person does could 
be a case of trying to act, regardless of the question of what mental states one 
must have in order to successfully act. Since laws against attempts are laws 
against trying to do things that we take, for their own reasons, to be worthy 
of legal proscription, any just law governing attempt will have intent to act as 
an element. 
The proposition that one tries to act only if one intends to act implies 
that completed crimes can be individuated more finely than attempts. That 
is, it is often the case that completed crimes C1 and C2 are of different types, 
despite the fact that an attempt to perform C1 and an attempt to perform C2 
are of the same type. For instance, imagine that two drivers, S1 and S2, are 
drag racing. As they speed down the road, both know that they are risking the 
death of passing pedestrians. But imagine that S 1 actually intends to kill a 
pedestrian, while S2 does not. It's not that Sl has his mind on two things, 
winning the race and killing a pedestrian, as he drives down the road; rather, 
he, like S2, is only thinking about winning the race, but, unlike S2 he went 
out drag racing with the aim of killing a pedestrian. Now imagine that dur-
ing the course of the race, each drivf'f kills a pedestrian. Under many statu-
tory schemes they have committed different crimes, for many statutory 
schemes individuate completed crimes by appeal to intent: to kill with intent 
is a purposive homicide, while to kill knowing there's a risk that you might is 
merely reckless homicide. But what could the difference be between attempts 
to commit these two crimes? In order to attempt either crime, a person 
would have to intend to kill, for trying necessarily requires intent, as has been 
argued here. Thus, although completed crimes can be of different types when 
they differ only with respect to intent, attempted crimes cannot differ only in 
this respect, for every attempt includes intent. 
We might think that this shows that it is possible to attempt only crimes 
that it is possible to complete with intent, unlike reckless homicide where 
intent undermines its recklessness. Better, however, is to see the result as 
showing, instead, that attempts are always attempts to commit some unspec-
ified crime in a particular category, where the categories are defined broadly 
enough to include all of those grades that differ from one another only by 
the accompanying mental states of the defendant. There are attempts to kill, 
but there aren't attempts to commit negligent, reckless, or purposive homi-
cide; there's no such thing as an attempt to commit a particular grade of 
homicide, but only an attempt to commit homicide, period. Thus, even if 
both of our drag racers are not guided by an intent to kill at the final 
moment before crashing into their unfortunate victims-imagine that both 
have genuinely lost control of their vehicles at that moment-one, namely 
the one who went out racing with an intention to kill, has done all that is 
required to be guilty of an attempted homicide. Both kill, and both killings 
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are the result of recklessness on the part of the drivers; but one of these 
homicides was attempted, while the other was not. 
There is a further practical upshot of the view that, where members of a 
category of crime are individuated by mental state, it is only categories of 
crime that are attempted. In many states, and under the Model Penal Code 
§5.05(l), IS the sentence for an attempt is tied to the sentence for the com-
pleted crime. Commonly, for instance, although not under the Model Penal 
Code, the sentence for an attempted crime is half the sentence for the com-
pleted crime. But what has been shown here is that this practice lacks an ade-
quate rationale, for sentencing of completed crimes is often a function of the 
mental states that are elements of those crimes. Reckless homicides, for 
instance, are given much less stiff penalties than intended homicides. If 
attempts can't be individuated with reference to specific completed crimes, 
but only with reference to categories of completed crimes, then sentences for 
attempts ought not to be tied to the sentences for specific crimes; such crimes 
often belong to the same category (i.e., homicide) while differing greatly from 
one another in penalty. 
While it is right to say that trying lies at the basis of the connection 
between the mind and the body exhibited in action, what's been shown here 
is that there is little reason to think that there is more to that connection than 
intention in the mind, behavior in the body, and a connection, probably 
causal, between the two. It has been shown here, also, that the law can learn 
much from what may seem to be no more than a philosophical fact (in the 
pejorative sense of the term "philosophical") about this relationship between 
the mind and body. 
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One of the central questions under discussion in this literature is this: Is the strong 
consistency requirement violable? That is, is it possible to intend to act while believing you 
will not, as Bratman assumes? There are difficult questions here linked, at bottom, to 
difficult questions about the distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility. On 
the one hand, it seems that, since there is no logical contradiction in the idea of any par-
ticular combination of mental states present in a particular mind no matter what their 
content-just as there's no logical contradiction in the idea of a library containing books 
that contradict each other-there is no impossibility in it. On the other hand, if there 
could be metaphysical impossibility without logical, then this inference does not follow; 
perhaps the nature of certain mental states is such as to exclude others from the mind. 
Even if there is such a thing as metaphysical impossibility, however, it doesn't follow that 
it is metaphysically impossible to intend while believing in failure. In any event, I will be 
assuming that Bratman is right: the pressure not to believe you will fail that is imposed by 
an intention is normative rather than metaphysical. The same goes, I assume, for the other 
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13. Ginet, "Trying to Act," 95-96. 
14. Bratman is well known for having shown that intention has "two faces": one having to do 
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Bratman takes trying, like aiming, to contribute to intentional action. However, what is 
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